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J. Chandler Bailey*
You shall give iffe for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. ..
L Introduction
A guiding principle of this nation's criminal justice system, deriving its
roots from age old notions of fairness, is that the punishment should fit the
crime. The United States Supreme Court has adopted this principle through
its conclusion that the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality guaran-
tee.2 The Court has used this guarantee to bar punishments that it finds
"grossly disproportionate" to the object crimes.' Twenty years ago, the
Supreme Court used this proportionality doctrine to support its finding that the
death penalty was an unconstitutionally excessive punishment for the rape of
an adult woman.4 Recently, Louisiana challenged the limits of this decision
by enacting a law authorizing the death penalty for the rape of a child under
* The author would like to thank Professor Penny White for her invaluable assistance
in the creation of this Note. The author would also like to thank Jamie Alley and JeffKeithline
for their comments and editorial assistance.
1. Exodus 21:23-25. Readers often interpret this comment as vengeful; however, its
actual intent was to set limits to ensure that the payment did not exceed the debt actually
incurred. See JESSE JACKSON& JESSE JACKSON, JR., LEGAL LYNCING 181 (1996) (advocating
abolition of death penalty).
2. See Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (upholding Georgia's death penalty
in face of Eighth Amendment challenge). The Court found that a punishment is excessive if it
is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. Id.
3. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983) (recognizing Court's proscription of
statutes providing grossly disproportionate punishments).
4. See Cokerv. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,592 (1977) (finding death penalty disproportion-
ate punishment for crime of rape of adult woman).
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the age of twelve.5 The Louisiana Supreme Court recently upheld this law in
the face of a constitutional challenge based on the proportionality doctrine.6
This Note examines whether, in light of Supreme Court precedent, Louisi-
ana's capital child rape statute does, in fact, pass constitutional muster.
Part II of this Note outlines the development of the proportionality
doctrine in the United States.7 This historical survey includes a brief discus-
sion of the rationale of early cases employing proportionality review. Part II
also identifies some general factors from these early cases that guide the
Supreme Court's decisions in this area.! Part III of this Note specifically
addresses the role of proportionality review in capital sentencing.9 In addi-
tion, Part III discusses two important Supreme Court decisions based on the
proportionality doctrine.'0 This discussion focuses on basic constitutional
requirements for proportionality review of capital punishment." Part IV
analyzes the Supreme Court's decision finding the death penalty unconstitu-
tionally excessive for the rape of an adult woman. ' This discussion addresses
the reasoning underlying the Court's decision and includes selected state
reactions to the Court's decision. 3 Part V of this Note details Louisiana's
capital child rape statute and discusses the reasoning the Louisiana Supreme
Court employed when it upheld the statute in the face of a proportionality
attack.'4 Finally, Part VI of this Note critiques the Louisiana court's analysis
5. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 1996) (imposing death penalty for aggravated
rape when victim is under 12 years old).
6. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1073 (La. 1996) (holding that death penalty for
rape of child under 12 is not excessive punishment), cert. deniedsub nom. Bethley v. Louisiana,
117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari; however, three
Justices attached a statement that indicated the Court's denial was not a decision on the merits
of the claim. Bethley, 117 S. Ct. at 2425-26. Instead, the Justices noted ajurisdictional bar to
the Court's review in that the cases had not proceeded to final conviction and thus were not ripe
for the Court's review. Id.
7. See infra Part II.A-B (outlining development of proportionality doctrine).
8. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (identifying three guiding factors for
proportionality review).
9. See infra Part III.A-C (analyzing proportionality review of capital sentences).
10. See infra notes 71-90 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's decisions
in Enmund v. Florida and Coker v. Georgia).
11. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing factors Supreme Court has
used in proportionality review for capital cases).
12. See infra Part IV.A-C (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Coker v. Georgia);
see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (finding death penalty excessive punish-
ment in cases of rape of adult female).
13. See infra notes 150-66 and accompanying text (discussing Florida's and Mississippi's
reactions to Coker).
14. See infra Part V.A-B (discussing Louisiana's punishment of child rape with death
penalty).
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and concludes that the death penalty for child rape is an unconstitutionally
excessive punishment based on United States Supreme Court precedent or a
properly conducted proportionality review.15
II. The History of Proportionality Review in American Jurisprudence
Philosophy professor Burton Leiser once wrote that "there must be some
principles that can be applied to determine which penalties are appropriate and
which are not, which penalties are too light and which are excessive." 6 The
proportionality doctrine, embodied within the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against "cruel and unusual punishments,"' 7 establishes these principles in
Americanjurisprudence. The United States Supreme Court has long debated
the exact meaning of the Eighth Amendment's requirement of proportionality
between crime and punishment.' However, the definitions and requirements
that the Court has provided often have done more to confuse the issue than to
provide any meaningful standards.'
Chief Justice Burger described the Court's Eighth Amendment decisions
as "less than lucid."'" This sentiment exists due to the Supreme Court's
attempts to expand or contract the breadth of the proportionality doctrine in
order to adapt to the constantly changing attitudes of our nation's society.'
15. See infra Part VI.A-C (critiquing Louisiana Supreme Court's ruling that found death
penalty constitutional for child rape).
16. BURTON M. LEISER, LiBERTY, JusTIcE, AND MORALS: CONTEMPORARY VALUE
CONFLIcTs 219 (3d ed. 1986).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. TheEighthnAmendmentprovidesthat"excessivebail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id
18. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100 (1958) (finding that Eighth Amendment
contains proportionality guarantee that bans punishments that are excessive to crimes for which
they are imposed).
19. See id. at 99-102 (finding that Eighth Amendment bans not only types of punishment
but degrees of punishment that are offensive to constitutional principles); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910) (finding proportionality guarantee within Eighth Amend-
ment in striking down 15 year prison sentence at hard labor for crime of falsifying documents).
20. Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (holding life imprisonment
disproportionate to crime of utterance), and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)
(holding that death penalty was disproportionate penalty when defendant in felony murder did
notkill and did not intend to kill), with Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 151 (1987) (finding that
death sentence was proportionate to felony murder when defendants did not kill but exhibited
"reckless indifference to human life"), and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980)
(holding that mandatory life sentence was not disproportionate to crime of forging checks).
21. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 614 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (warning
that state reaction to recent inconsistent Supreme Court holdings on Eighth Amendment issues
could provide false indications of societal opinions as to what constitutes "cruel and unusual"
punishment).
22. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01 (stating that Eighth Amendment is not static but must
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A. Early Doctrine
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court applied
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause only to cases of torture and
barbaric cruelty.' Throughout this century, the Court has gradually broad-
ened its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment to include a prohibition
against punishments that are greatly disproportionate to the crimes for which
they are imposed.' Although the Court has conceded that the legislature has
broad discretion to set punishments, the Court has also indicated that it is "a
precept ofjustice that punishment for crime should be graduated and propor-
tioned to [the] offense."' By the 1950s, the Court no longer applied the
proportionality doctrine to only its inquiry into barbaric types of punishment.
Instead, the Court began to review punishments to decide whether the length
and severity of the punishment conformed to the nation's evolving standards
of decency.26 In other words, a punishment must not stray too far from what
"draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society").
23. David J. Karp, Comment, Coker v. Georgia: Disproportionate Punishment and the
Death Penalty For Rape, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1714, 1714 (1978) (describing Supreme Court's
early Eighth Amendment interpretation).
24. See id. at 1715 (discussing Supreme Court's interpretation of Eighth Amendment that
included bans on disproportionate sentences as well as barbaric sentences).
25. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (finding thatjudicial branch
holds power to review legislative penal statutes to ensure compliance with constitutional
mandates). In Weems, the Supreme Court considered whether a sentence of 15 years at hard
labor for the crime of falsifying checks was excessive. Id. at 366. In addition, the defendant
would spend his sentence shackled with chains around his wrists and ankles. Id While recog-
nizing the deference due to legislative autonomy, the Court nevertheless found ajudicial duty
to ensure proportionality between crime and punishmen Id. The Court demonstrated the dis-
proportionate relationship between Weems's crime and his punishment by comparing other,
more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction that called for more lenient penalties. Id. at 380-
81. Likewise, the Court considered comparable United States statutes for similar offenses. Id.
The Court concluded that the Philippines, the jurisdiction imposing the punishment in this case,
punished various degrees of homicide, inciting rebellion, and robbery more leniently than
Weems's offense. Id. The Court determined these crimes were much more serious than
Weems's offense. Id. Further, the Court noted that federal law only imposed a maximum
penalty of two years imprisonment for such an offense. Id. Based on these factors, the Court
declared the sentence unconstitutional. Id. Thus, the Court, for the first time, recognized a
proportionality guarantee within the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. Id
26. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (discussing precise meaning of Eighth
Amendment's proportionality guarantee). In Trop, the Court considered whether the depriva-
tion of the defendant's citizenship for his desertion from the army in World War II constituted
an excessive penalty. Id at 88. The Court found that the Eighth Amendment bans not only
types of punishment but also degrees of punishment that are "offensive to cardinal principles
for which the Constitution stands." Id at 102. Further, the Court compared the laws of the
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society feels is just and proper for the given crime. This "evolving standards"
doctrine is the principal concept to emerge from early Supreme Court propor-
tionality discussions and is still a guiding force in today's proportionality
jurisprudence.27
B. Recent Changes in the Proportionality Doctrine
Although the "evolving standards" doctrine continues to survive in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, recent Court decisions involving proportional-
ity review have produced varied results because of two competing notions.2"
First, the United States's system of federalism envisions that each state
legislature is the proper forum for discussion of matters relating to crime and
punishment.29 The logical result of such a federal system is that different
legislatures in different regions naturally will differ on what types of crimes
deserve more severe punishments." The second factor influencing Supreme
Court jurisprudence involving proportionality review is the Eighth Amend-
nations of the world to find virtual unanimity in each nation's decision not to impose denation-
alization as a penalty for desertion. Id at 103. In evaluating the defendant's Eighth Amend-
ment challenge, the Court stated that "the words ofthe Amendment are not precise." Id at 100.
Therefore, the Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." Id Applying this standard, the Court held that the
deprivation of citizenship was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 101.
27. See Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119, 1120 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(accepting that Eighth Amendment's proportionality guarantee "draw[s] its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" (quoting Trop, 356
U.S. at 101)); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (stating that Eighth Amendment must
draw its meaning from society's evolving standards of decency). But cf Susan Raeker-Jordan,
A Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional Construct: The Supreme Court's Evolving Stan-
dard ofDecencyfor the Death Penalty, 23 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 455,457 (1996) (criticizing
"evolving standards" test as susceptible to manipulation).
28. Compare Rummelv. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,284(1980) (deciding thatTexas recidivist
statute calling for third time felons to receive life sentences survives proportionality review
based on legislative autonomy and prerogative), andHarmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,996
(1991) (affirming life sentence imposed on first time drug offender despite attack based on lack
of proportionality of sentence), with Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (holding that
South Dakota recidivist statute imposing mandatory life sentence on third time felons violates
Eighth Amendment's proportionality guarantee).
29. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing role of Court in
determinations of punishments). Justice Kennedy stated that "the fixing of prison terms for
specific crimes involves a substantive penological judgment that, as a general matter, is 'prop-
erly within the province of legislatures, not courts."' Id (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275-76).
30. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 990. Justice Scalia's majority opinion acknowledges that
some states will always treat particular offenders more harshly than other states. Id. Such
diversity is the "very raison d'etre of our federal system." Id.
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ment's guarantee against "cruel and unusual punishments."'" This guarantee
competes with a federalist system by setting limits on any one state's authority
to impose certain punishments that offend constitutional standards.32 Due to
these equally intense yet competing notions, the Court has recently vacillated
on its position as to which cases it will review for proportionality and to what
extent such an inquiry should proceed.3
Until recently, it appeared settled in Supreme Court jurisprudence that
the Eighth Amendment requires proportionality between the crime and pun-
ishment.3 4 However, the exact application of such a requirement to specific
cases has produced varied and often contradictory results.35 In Harmelin v.
Michigan," the Supreme Court markedly altered the judicial landscape of
proportionality review." The Harmelin Court found that a mandatory life
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
32. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (stating that although legislative
attitudes are important factor in Eighth Amendment cases, constitutional concerns mandate
Supreme Court's review of punishments to ensure punishments comport with Eighth Amend-
ment requirements).
33. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92 (deciding that objective factors should guide propor-
tionality review). These factors include (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on similar or more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction;
and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in otherjurisdictions. Id. But
cf Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986-90 (criticizing Solem's three factors as troublesome if not
impossible to compare objectively).
34. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,303 (1983) (setting aside sentence of life without
possibility of parole for conviction under South Dakota recidivist statute as disproportionate
penalty in relation to crime); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (finding that deprivation
of U.S. citizenship as punishment for absence without leave from military for one day is
disproportionate sentence); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910) (stating that
courts must ensure proportionality between crime and punishment).
35. Compare Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980) (deciding Texas recidivist
statute allowing mandatory life sentences for third time offenders does not impose dispropor-
tionate punishment even if three predicate offenses were relatively minor) with Solem, 463 U.S.
at 303 (finding that South Dakota recidivist statute's imposition of mandatory life sentence on
third time felons violates proportionality guarantee of Eighth Amendment).
36. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
37. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,996 (1991) (affirming life sentence imposed
on defendant for first time drug possession conviction). In Harmelin, the Court considered
whether a life sentence imposed on a first time drug offender constituted an excessive punish-
ment. Id. at 961. The defendant in Harmelin appealed a mandatory life sentence without the
possibility of parole following his conviction for possession of 672 grams of cocaine. Id.
Harmelin contended that such a harsh penalty was "significantly disproportionate" to the crime.
Id. Justice Scalia authored the Court's opinion and began by concluding that the Eighth
Amendment contained no proportionality guarantee. Id. at 965. However, only Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia in this portion of the opinion. Id. at 962-65. Although only
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sentence imposed on a first time offender convicted of cocaine possession did
not constitute a disproportionate penalty in light of the offense.38 The Court
indicated that it would not supplant most legislative determinations regarding
punishment with its own views as long as the punishment involved incarcera-
tion rather than the death penalty. 9
In fact, Justice Scalia concluded that the Eighth Amendment contains no
proportionality guarantee. 40 This position has garnered some scholarly criti-
cism because it ignores a long line of Supreme Court precedent recognizing
a narrow proportionality requirement.41 Furthermore, seven other Justices of
the Harmelin Court did not share Justice Scalia's opposition to the existence
of a proportionality guarantee.42 Although Justice Scalia's opposition to a
proportionality guarantee in the Eighth Amendment might not be widely held,
it illustrates the wide variation in Eighth Amendment interpretation.
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's view, the Court has consistently ac-
knowledged a proportionality requirement within the Eighth Amendment
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist did not find a proportionality guarantee, a majority
of the Court agreed that it should not interpret Solem and Coker too broadly. Id. at 1001
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, sentences need not be strictly proportional to their respective
crimes, but may not be "grossly disproportionate" to those crimes. Id. (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring). The Court indicated that in the noncapital context, it would be increasingly hesitant to
draw lines between sentences of varying lengths and refused to draw such a line in Harmelin's
case. Id. at 996. Thus, the Court upheld Harmelin's conviction and found the life imprisonment
of a first time drug offender was not an unconstitutionally excessive punishment Id.
38. Id. at 994-96.
39. Id. at 994. The Court discussed its precedents in which it struck down the death
penalty as disproportionate to the crimes at issue in the cases. Id. Although the Court reaf-
firmed decisions such as Coker and Enmund, it did so on the theory that "death is different" and
requires protections that other forms of punishment do not. Id. The Court acknowledged the
appropriateness of a stricter adherence to meaningful proportionality review in capital sentence
review but did not extend the exacting standards of Coker outside of capital issues. Id.
40. Id. at 965. Only Chief Justice Rehnquistjoined Justice Scalia in this portion of the
majority opinion. Id
41. See Margaret R. Gibbs, Note, EighthAmendment-Narrow ProportionalityRequire-
ment PreservesDeference to Legislative Judgment, 82 J. CRni. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 955,968-72
(1992) (criticizing Justice Scalia's assertion that Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality
guarantee as inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent).
42. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy, in an
opinionjoinedby Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter, acknowledged that the Court's decisions
"recognize that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause encompasses a narrow proportional-
ity principle." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see id at 1012 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White, joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens, concluded that "there can be no doubt
that prior decisions of this Court have construed [the Eighth Amendment] to include a propor-
tionality principle." Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall filed a separate dissent in which
he agreed with Justice White's assertion that the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality
principle. Id. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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through its continued practice of invalidating punishments when it finds the
punishment lacks proportionality to the crime.43 When conducting a propor-
tionality review, the Supreme Court has warned that the subjective views of
individual judges must not supplant the determinations of duly elected legisla-
tures, absent some objective criteria.44 Consequently, the Court has developed
the following three general factors for courts to use in proportionality review:
(1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) the sen-
tences imposed on similarly grave offenses within the same jurisdiction; and
(3) the sentences imposed on the same crime in otherjurisdictions. 45 Despite
the general reliance on these factors,46 they have been criticized because they
are difficult to apply objectively.47 As Justice Scalia points out in Harmelin,
our federal system allows one state to criminalize an act that other states may
not punish at all.48 According to Justice Scalia, it is simply an extension of
federalism that one state may punish an act more harshly than a neighboring
state.49 Thus, adherence to a federal system leads courts to give great defer-
43. See Enmundv. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,783-84 (1982) (finding death penalty excessive
as punishment for felony murder when defendant neither killed nor intended to kill); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (concluding that death sentence for rape of adult woman is
grossly disproportionate penalty and therefore unconstitutional); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 667 (1963) (finding that statute criminally penalizing narcotics addiction violates
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment).
44. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (stating that Court should use objective criteria rather than
subjective views when conducting proportionality review).
45. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983) (employing these three factors to
find sentence of life imprisonment disproportionate to crime of utterance). But see Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 986-90 (1991) (criticizing these factors because they do not provide
actual objectivity because no universal standards of gravity exist across all jurisdictions).
46. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788 (embracing use of objective factors in proportionality
analysis); Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (stating that objective factors must guide Court's proportional-
ity review to maximum extent possible).
47. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986-90 (criticizing use of alleged objective factors because
factors are incapable of objective application). Justice Scalia's opinion finds it impossible to
weigh objectively the "gravity" of an offense as the first factor requires. Id. at 987-88. Justice
Scalia believes the gravity of an offense is entirely subjective and necessarily depends on the
criminal issues that are most troubling in a particular region. Id. Thus, only the Michigan legis-
lature should determine what penalties are necessary for the specific crimes that plague the
streets of Detroit. Id. at 988.
48. See id. at 989 (hypothesizing that some states may punish killing same endangered
wild animals for which other states offer bounties).
49. Id. A short hypothetical will help to illustrate this point. For instance, it is perfectly
conceivable that the state of Texas would choose to outlaw cattle thievery and provide severe
penalties for this crime. However, a state such as New Jersey may apply an extremely lenient
sentence for this same crime because New Jersey's cattle industry is not as important to New
Jersey as Texas's cattle industry is to Texas. Thus, in Texas, a cattle thief s sentence would
likely be vastly disproportionate to a cattle thief s sentence in New Jersey. However, the
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ence to state legislatures." Although this deference is due in part to notions
of federalism, it also stems from the inherent difficulty in the process of
deciding which prison terms exceed allowable limits.5
Despite this difficulty, the judiciary has always possessed an intrinsic
duty to guarantee that the legislature acts within the bounds of the Constitu-
tion. 2 Naturally, this duty of the judiciary to ensure the constitutionality of
legislative actions intensifies when those legislative acts subject a United
States citizen to the possibility of execution.53 The next Part of this Note
reviews the Court's application of the proportionality guarantee to capital
punishment.54
III Role of Proportionality in Capital Sentencing
A. General Use of Proportionality Review of Death Penalties
Despite the uncertain future of proportionality review in the realm of
noncapital cases,55 courts have applied the proportionality doctrine more con-
sistently in death penalty cases.56 In fact, numerous states require, by statute,
cherished notion of federalism, which is deeply rooted in our nation's history, demands that
state legislatures should address peculiarly local concerns in appropriately local manners. The
result of these varying local attitudes toward crime is that a court would have a difficult time
comparing the sentences of these two hypothetical cattle thieves.
50. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980) (refusing to draw line between
prison terms of varying years because "Texas is entitled to make its own judgment as to where
such lines lie"); State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (La. 1996) (concluding that courts
should exercise caution in asserting their views over views of legislature).
51. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275 (addressing difficulties involved in second-guessing
legislative decisions). The Court stated that an "extensive intrusion into the basic line-drawing
process that is pre-eminently the province ofthe legislature when it makes an act criminal would
be difficult." Id
52. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (finding that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"); see also
Enmundv. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,797 (1982) (concluding that it is ultimately Supreme Court's
duty to determine whether Eighth Amendment precludes death penalty for certain crimes).
53. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,994 (1991) (finding death sentence different
than any other punishment and therefore Court correctly imposes increased constitutional
protections on death sentences).
54. See infra notes 55-71 and accompanying text (discussing role of proportionality
review in capital punishment).
55. See Marc A. Paschke, Note, Harmelin v. Michigan: Punishment Need Not Fit the
Crime, 23 LOY. U. Cn. L.J. 273, 306 (1992) (concluding that Harmelin's impact will include
virtual disappearance of successful proportionality challenges outside of capital cases).
56. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 783-84 (employing proportionality review to hold death
penalty excessive for crime of robbery when defendant neither killed nor intended to kill);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that death penalty is "grossly dispropor-
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their state supreme courts to review every death sentence imposed to ensure
proportionality between the crime and the death sentence. 7 Although many
factors guide the Supreme Court's review of a death sentence, two principal
reasons have led to the Court's increased acceptance of proportionality review
in capital cases." First, the Court recognizes that the death penalty is unlike
any other form of punishment and that its implementation demands unique
constitutional protections. 9 The finality and unique nature of the death
penalty causes even those normally opposed to proportionality review to admit
its importance in the capital context." For example, in Harmelin, Justice
tionate" to crime ofrape ofadultwoman); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,239-40 (1972) (per
curiam) (invalidating Georgia's death penalty scheme in part because it lacked proportionality
review provisions).
57. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b)(3) (1997) (requiring thatAlabama Supreme Court
and appellate courts conduct proportionality review on all death sentences); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 279, § 71 (West 1997) (requiring that Massachusetts Supreme Court review all death
sentences for proportionality); S.C. CODEANN. § 16-3-25(C)(3) (Law Co-op. 1997) (requiring
that South Carolina Supreme Court conduct proportionality review on all death sentences).
58. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for increased
judicial acceptance of proportionality review in capital cases).
59. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam) (invalidating Georgia's death penalty in part
for violating proportionality requirement of Eighth Amendment). Justice Stewart stated in his
concurring opinion:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in
degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejec-
tion of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it
is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept
of humanity.
Id.; see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,994 (1991) (discussing proportionality review in
capital cases). Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Harmelin states: "Proportionality review is
one of several respects in which we have held that 'death is'different,' and have imposed
protections that the Constitution nowhere else provides." Id.
60. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 (finding need for proportionality review in death
penalty cases after opinion previously found that no general proportionality guarantee exists in
Eighth Amendment). Increased proportionality protections are vital in any attempt to impose
the death penalty for child rape because of the Supreme Court's recently relaxed evidentiary
protections in cases of child molestation. Cf Allison C. Goodman, Note, Two CriticalEviden-
tiary Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Closed-Circuit Testimony by Child Victims and
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 32 Am. CpRM. L. REv. 855, 875-82 (1995) (evaluating impact
of recent Supreme Court decisions regarding admissibility of evidence in cases of sexual assault
on children). Goodman expresses concern over the recent Supreme Court decision in White v.
Illinois, which greatly relaxed evidentiary standards to the detriment of defendants in cases of
child sexual abuse. Id.; see White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354 (1992) (finding no need to
demonstrate child witness's unavailability in order to invoke hearsay exceptions to allow
testimony of child victim's doctor and babysitter). The Court admitted into evidence a state-
ment that the victim made to her babysitter immediately following the alleged assault and the
testimony of the doctor who attended to the child under the "excited utterance" and "medical
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Scalia stated that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guaran-
tee."' However, later in that same opinion, Justice Scalia agreed with prior
Court decisions invalidating death sentences under the Eighth Amendment as
excessive in relation to the underlying crimes. 2 Justice Scalia found that
proportionality review in capital cases is proper because the unique and final
nature of the death penalty requires increased constitutional protections. 3
The second reason leading to greaterjudicial acceptance of proportional-
ity review in capital cases relates to the unique nature of the death penalty as
a punishment.' A proportionality review involving a death sentence is easier
for courts because such a review can be conducted more objectively than the
difficult and highly subjective task of comparing prison terms of varying
lengths. 5 Therefore, because the death penalty is qualitatively different than
imprisonment for any length of time, it is easier for reviewing courts to find
the death penalty excessive for certain types of crimes.6 The existence of
such an objective guidepost because of the qualitative difference of the death
penalty is important because, as with proportionality review in the noncapital
cases, the Supreme Court has endorsed the use of objective factors to guide
care" exceptions to the hearsay rule. Id. at 356. The Court found both exceptions to the hearsay
rule to be "firmly rooted" in jurisprudence, so that the trustworthiness of the testimony was not
an issue. Id. at 357. Perhaps most importantly, despite previous beliefs to the contrary, the
Court found no need for the State to demonstrate that the child was unavailable or unable to
testify in order to invoke such "firmly rooted" exceptions to the hearsay rule. Id. at 354. While
it might be sound policy to relax a defendant's right to confront his accusers in order to protect
the innocent child victims of sexual assault from having to relive the trauma through live trial
testimony, such a policy necessitates that the judiciary steadfastly guard other rights of the
defendant.
61. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965 (asserting that there is-no proportionality requirement
within Eighth Amendment). Only Chief Justice Rehnquistjoined Justice Scalia in this conclu-
sion. Id.
62. See id. at 994 (finding that Court properly decided Coker and Enmundbecause death
penalty cases call for heightened judicial scrutiny).
63. See id. (stating that "death is different"). Justice Scalia made this statement after
already finding that the Eighth Amendment does not generally contain a proportionality
guarantee. Id. However, when dealing with the precedents of Coker and Enmund, two cases
standing for the requirement of proportionality, Scalia admitted that the Court decided those
cases correctly. Id. However, he limited such proportionality exclusively to the field of capital
cases and refused to extend the doctrine out of the context of the death penalty. Id.
64. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,274-75 (1980) (recognizing Supreme Court's
ability to draw "bright line" between death sentences and various permutations of prison
sentences).
65. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (noting difficulty of applying propor-
tionality review in noncapital context).
66. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at274-75 (distinguishing death penalty from term ofimprison-
ment).
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its proportionality analysis in capital cases.67 Those objective factors mirror
the factors used in the noncapital context and include the following: (1) the
gravity of the penalty in relation to the crime; (2) the sentences imposed
within the same jurisdiction on similar or more serious crimes; and (3) the
sentences imposed in otherjurisdictions for the same crime.6" Although some
courts have criticized the use of these factors in the noncapital context,6 9 the
contrasts between the death penalty and other sentences have led to greater
acceptance of these factors in capital proportionality review.7" Thus, in the
last twenty years, the Supreme Court has applied these factors in finding the
death penalty disproportionate to two separate classes of crimes in two land-
mark decisions.7
B. Enmund v. Florida
In Enmund v. Florida,72 the Court considered whether the death penalty
was a disproportionate sentence for a defendant involved in a felony-murder
who did not actually shoot the victims of a robbery or possess any intent to
kill.73 A jury convicted the defendant and sentenced him to death as a result
67. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (finding objective factors crucial
to proper proportionality review of death sentence); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,592 (1977)
(endorsing objective factors to guide proportionality review of death penalty for crime of rape).
68. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789-97 (conducting proportionality review using objective
factors).
69. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 986-90 (1991) (finding factors difficult to
apply with objectivity).
70. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275 (1980) (endorsing Court's use of propor-
tionality review to invalidate death penalty for rape of adult woman in Coker). The Court found
Coker's proportionality analysis acceptable because the Court could "draw a 'bright line'
between the punishment of death and the various other permutations and commutations of
punishments short of that ultimate sanction." Id.; see Steven Grossman, Proportionality inNon-
Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court's TorturedApproach to Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment, 84 KY. L.J. 107, 152 (1996) (finding that irrevocability and severity of death penalty
affords courts better opportunity to objectively apply proportionality analysis than in compari-
son of differing lengths of prison terms).
71. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 783-84 (finding death penalty disproportionate for felony-
murder defendant who neither killed nor intended to kill); Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (finding death
penalty grossly disproportionate to crime of rape of adult woman).
72. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
73. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 783-84 (1982) (finding death penalty dispro-
portionate punishment for felony-murder defendant who neither killed nor intended to kill). In
Enmund, the Court considered whether the death penalty constituted excessive punishment for
a getaway driver involved in a robbery felony-murder who did not actually kill the victims and
had no intent to kill. Id. at 784. During the course of the robbery, one of Enmund's accompli-
ces shot and killed an elderly couple. Id. Thejury convicted Enmund under the felony-murder
doctrine as a principal in the first degree murder and sentenced him to death. Id. On appeal,
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of his role as the driver in the armed robbery of an elderly couple.74 The facts
showed not only that the petitioner did not kill the victims, but also that he did
not contemplate that one of his accomplices would kill the couple.75 Thus, the
Court determined that the petitioner lacked any intent to kill.76 The Court next
observed that only eight jurisdictions in the United States imposed the death
penalty on defendants involved in felony-murders who did not kill or possess
any intent to kill.77 Furthermore, the Court followed precedent in reviewing
the attitudes of the international community on this issue." The Court noted
that England abolished its own felony-murder doctrine and that the rest of
Europe had never adopted the doctrine.79 This lack of societal support for the
death penalty in cases such as Enmund's prompted the Court to conclude
popular sentiment weighed heavily againstthe imposition of the death penalty
for the crime at issue.8" Thus, the Court found "death [to be] an unconstitu-
tional penalty absent an intent to kill."'"
Enmund argued that the death penalty constituted a disproportionate punishment in light of the
fact that he served only as a driver and had no intent to kill. Id. The Court employed the
traditional proportionality analysis, focusing on the type of punishment, legislative attitudes,
international opinion, and sentencing decisions ofjuries. Id. at 788-89. The Court found that
only eightjurisdictions in the country allowed for the imposition of the death penalty for felony-
murder. Id at 792-93. The Court also looked to international opinion, noting that several
nations had abolished or severely restricted the felony-murder doctrine. Id. at 796 n.22. These
factors led the Court to find the death penalty a disproportionate punishment for defendants
such as Enmund, who lack the requisite culpable mental state for murder. Id. at 796, 799. But
see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (limiting Enmundby holding that death penalty
is not disproportionate for felony-murder convictions of defendants who did not kill but who
exhibited "reckless indifference to human life").
74. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 784.
75. Id
76. Id. at 796.
77. Id at 792-93.
78. See id. at 796 n.22 (citing Coker as authority to examine international opinion).
Enmund based its international review on Coker's statement that "the climate of international
opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment" is relevant to a complete
proportionality review. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977). Butcf Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (determining that Eighth Amendment does not preclude
imposition of death penalty on defendants who commit crimes at 16 or 17 years of age). When
the Stanford Court addressed the issue of societal standards of decency, it emphasized that it
would review "American conceptions of decency" and not international standards. Id. at 369 n. 1.
79. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982).
80. See id (acknowledging more societal support for death penalty in present case than
in Coker but concluding that societal sentiment still rejected death penalty in this case). But see
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (applying felony-murder doctrine to affirm death
penalty for defendant who did not actually kill in commission of felony but demonstrated
reckless disregard for human life).
81. Enmund, 458 U.S. at796.
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C. Coker v. Georgia
In Coker v. Georgia,82 the Supreme Court also addressed the applicability
of the death penalty to an entire class of crimes.8 3 Coker involved a propor-
tionality challenge to a Georgia statute imposing the death penalty in cases of
aggravated rape.84 The Court used a proportionality analysis focusing on the
type and severity of the punishment in relation to the crime.85 The Court also
assessed the trends of state legislatures in setting punishments for rape.86 This
analysis of legislative trends centered on the punishments for rape not only in
this country, but also throughout the developed nations of the world. 7 Geor-
gia was the only Americanjurisdiction imposing the death penalty for the rape
of an adult woman, and only three out of sixty surveyed nations imposed such
a penalty.88 The results of this analysis led the Court to find that the evidence
82. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
83. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (finding death penalty for rape of
adult woman grossly disproportionate). In Coker, the Supreme Court decided whetherthe death
penalty constituted a disproportionate punishment for a defendant convicted of raping an adult
woman. Id. The petitioner in Coker broke into a couple's home, tied up the husband, and raped
the wife at knife point. Id. at 587. Earlier in the evening, the petitioner had escaped from a
Georgia prison where he had been serving various sentences for murder, rape, and aggravated
assault. Id. Georgia's capital sentencing system, which the Supreme Court had recently
declared unconstitutional in Furman, was restructured prior to Coker, and the Court had
validated the new procedure. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (upholding
death sentence because Georgia's procedural requirements for imposition of capital sentence
ensured against arbitrary and random death sentences). Thus, in Coker, there were no proce-
dural challenges to the death sentence. Instead, the defendant simply claimed that rape was not
in the category of crimes deserving of the death penalty. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. The Court
evaluated the claim using the following objective factors: (1) the gravity of penalty in relation
to the crime; (2) the sentences imposed by the legislature for similar or more serious crimes in
the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for similar crimes.
Id. at 593-600. This analysis found that only three states allowed for the death penalty for rape,
and within those states, juries rarely imposed the death sentence. Id. at 595-96. Further,
Georgia law required that certain aggravating circumstances exist before defendants convicted
of deliberate killings could receive the death penalty. Id. at 600. Thus, rapists who did not kill
their victims could receive sentences that were more severe than those of the deliberate killer.
Id. The Court could not accept this anomaly and held that the death penalty is "an excessive
penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life." Id. at 598.
84. Id. at 592.
85. See id. at 597-98 (utilizing objective factors in analysis).
86. See id. at 593-96 (utilizing objective factors in analysis).
87. See id. at 596 n.10 (finding international opinion helpful in analysis). The Court
found support for its decision to conduct a survey of international opinion from its opinion in
Trop v. Dulles. Id.; see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (suggesting that international
opinion should enter into proportionality analysis to determine global society's feeling towards
particular punishments).
88. Coker, 433 U.S. at 595-96.
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"weigh[ed] very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a
suitable penalty for raping an adult woman." 9 The next Part of this Note
further examines the facts and reasoning of the Coker decision.9"
IV. Analysis of Coker v. Georgia
A. The Decision and Its Rationale
In Coker v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court found the death
penalty an unconstitutional punishment for the rape of an adult woman when
death does not result for the victim.91 Louisiana's capital rape statute imposes
the death penalty on a defendant convicted of the rape of a child under the age
of twelve when death does not result for the victim.' Thus, the only differ-
ence between the present Louisiana law and the invalidated Georgia law at
issue in Coker is the age of the victim. Given the similarity of the Georgia
law at issue in Coker and the current Louisiana law at issue in this Note, a
more comprehensive understanding of the facts and rationale of Coker will aid
in the analysis of the constitutionality of the present Louisiana capital child
rape statute.
On September 2, 1974, Ehrlich Anthony Coker escaped from a Georgia
state prison where he was serving various sentences for murder, rape, kidnap-
ping, and aggravated assault.93 Upon his escape, Coker broke into the home
of Allen and Elnita Carver at approximately 11:00 p.m.94 Coker tied up Mr.
Carver in the bathroom and proceeded to rape Mrs. Carver as he threatened
her with a knife.95 Coker stole the Carvers' car, kidnapped Mrs. Carver, and
then raped her before authorities captured him.96 Georgia charged Coker
under a law imposing the death penalty for rape under certain circumstances.97
89. Id at 596.
90. See infra Part IV.A (discussing facts and rationale of Coker).
91. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (finding death penalty grossly
disproportionate to crime of rape of adult woman).
92. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(C) (West 1996) (stating that if victim of aggravated
rape was under age of 12 years, then offender "shall be punished by death or life imprison-
ment").




97. See GA. CoDEANN. § 26-3102 (Supp. 1976) (allowing imposition of death penalty
only afterjury finding of statutory aggravating circumstance); id. § 27-2534.1 (listing statutory
aggravating circumstances). The relevant part of § 27-2534.1 allowed for the imposition of the
death penalty in cases of rape under the following three circumstances: (1) the rapist has a prior
conviction for a capital felony; (2) the rape was committed while the offender was engaged in
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Coker's rape of Mrs. Carver was committed with two of these circumstances
present: (1) Coker had a prior capital conviction; and (2) Coker raped Mrs.
Carver while engaged in an armed robbery.98 The jury convicted Coker and
imposed the death penalty.99 Coker appealed, arguing that capital punishment
in the case of rape was excessive and violated the Eighth Amendment's
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments.' 0
Five years prior to Coker, the United States Supreme Court in Furman
v. Georgia'' invalidated Georgia's death penalty because of flaws in Geor-
gia's death sentencing procedures that invited arbitrary and discriminatory
application of the death penalty."0 2 The year before the Supreme Court heard
Coker, the Court approved the new system that Georgia designed in reaction
to Furman, which alleviated the procedural infirmities.0 3 The defendant
in Coker, however, did not make a procedural challenge to Georgia's capi-
tal system, but instead attacked the proportionality of the death penalty for
a crime from which no death resulted." Therefore, Coker presented
the Supreme Court with its first chance in the post-Furman era to consider
the constitutionality of the death penalty for a crime other than murder. 5
committing another capital felony or aggravated battery; or (3) the rape was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggra-
vated battery on the victim. Id.
98. See id. § 27-2534.1(b)(1)-(2) (listing prior capital felony conviction and commission
of rape while engaged in armed robbery as two circumstances in which death penalty is
available for rape).
99. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.'584, 591 (1977).
100. Id. at 592.
101. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
102. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (invalidating
Georgia's death penalty statute due to arbitrary and discriminatory application). In Furman, the
Court addressed whether the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. The case consolidated appeals by three defen-
dants sentenced to death under Georgia and Texas law. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring). The
Court analyzed whether the sentencing procedures utilized in Georgia and Texas made the
imposition ofthe death penalty susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory application. Id. at 309
(Stewart, J., concurring). A majority ofthe Court concluded that the rarity ofthe death penalty's
imposition in this country suggests that it has not been regularly or fairly applied. Id. at 293
(Brennan, J., concurring). As Justice Stewart stated, the death penalty was "unusual" in that it
was so "wantonly and so freakishly imposed." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
103. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (finding that Georgia's new bifur-
cated capital sentencing structure provided sufficient safeguards against arbitrary or discrimina-
tory application).
104. See Karp, supra note 23, at 1716 (analyzing Coker and examining its possible future
implications).
105. See id. at 1715 (discussing prior Supreme Court decisions on death penalty prior to
Coker).
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The Coker Court attempted to discern aworkable framework for proportional-
ity review from the often unclear previous opinions of the Court on the
subject."°
The Court began its opinion by confirming its finding in Gregg v. Geor-
gia 7 that the "death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment."'08 However, the Coker Court
also found that the Eighth Amendment not only applies to barbaric punish-
ments but also bans those punishments that are excessive in relation to the
object crime." 9 Coker adopted Gregg's definition of "excessive" in that a
punishment is excessive if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to the
accepted goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless
and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of propor-
tion to the severity of the crime."0 Finally, the Court acknowledged the
importance of conducting a proportionality review based on objective factors,
rather than on the subjective views of individual Justices." Cokerlistedsuch
objective factors as public attitudes concerning a particular sentence, legisla-
tive attitudes toward a particular sentence, and the attitudes of juries as
reflected by their sentencing decisions that courts may consider."'
The analysis in Coker began with an examination of the historical and
presentjudgment of society concerning the imposition of the death penalty in
106. See Trop v. Dulles, 356U.S. 86,103 (1958) (holdingthat deprivation of United States
citizenship for soldier's military desertion violated Eighth Amendment's proportionality
guarantee); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,381 (1910) (holding that 15 year prison term
at hard labor with wrist and ankle shackles was unconstitutionally disproportionate to crime of
falsifying bank records).
107. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
108. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,591 (1977) (affirming Gregg's findingthat death
penalty is not inherently cruel and unusual); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207 (affirming Geor-
gia's death sentence procedures and finding that death penalty is not always cruel and unusual).
In Gregg, the Court addressed whether the imposition of the death penalty for murder violated
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 158. The case involved a defendant sentenced
to death after conviction on counts of armed robbery and murder. Id. Georgia's sentencing
procedures, which the Court had previously declared constitutionally deficient in Furman, were
no longer in existence. Id at 162-63. Instead, Georgia provided a bifurcated system in which
the first stage established the defendant's guilt or innocence and the second stage established
the punishment. Id. In the punishment stage, a list of aggravating and mitigating factors guided
the jury in order to ensure against arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 196-97.
These protections compelled the Court to affirm the imposition of the defendant's death penalty
because the additional protections instituted in Georgia assured that juries would no longer
"wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence." Id. at 207.
109. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
110. See id. (stating that punishments could fall on either of two grounds).
111. See id. at 593 (finding need for objective review).
112. Id. at 593-97.
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cases of rape."1 The Supreme Court emphasized that after Furman, states
choosing to impose the death penalty modified their capital sentencing proce-
dures in order to satisfy the requirements of Furman."4 Thirty-five states
immediately reinstated the death penalty for murder, leading to Gregg's
conclusion that a large section of our society endorsed the death penalty."5
However, the Coker Court found that the post-Furman capital legislation did
not indicate such a clear showing of popular support for the death penalty in
cases of rape." 6 Sixteen states included rape as a capital offense prior to
Furman."7 However, only three of those states, including Georgia, imposed
the death penalty for rape in their revised, post-Furman statutes."' Further-
more, the Court invalidated the other two state statutes on other grounds prior
to Coker.19 Thus, in 1977, only Georgia punished the rape of an adult woman
as a capital offense. 20 Coker considered only the constitutionality of the rape
of an adult woman, while acknowledging that two states, Florida and Missis-
sippi, authorized the death penalty for the rape of a child.' Parts IV.B and
IV.C of this Note discuss the reactions of Florida and Mississippi to Coker in
greater detail.1-
113. Id. at 593. The Court began by finding that at no time in the 50 years prior to Coker
had a majority of the states authorized death as a punishment for rape. Id. The Court found that
by 1971, just prior to the Court's decision in Furman that invalidated the death penalty
provisions in most states, 16 states and the federal government authorized capital punishment
for the rape of an adult female. Id.
114. See id. (discussing reaction to Furman).
115. Id. at 593-94.
116. Id. at594.
117. Id.
118. Id. The two states other than Georgia were Louisiana and North Carolina. Id.; see
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 1974) (defining crime of aggravated rape and mandating
death penalty upon conviction); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1975) (repealed 1979) (mandating
death sentence for crime of first degree rape). Louisiana and North Carolina mandated imposi-
tion of the death penalty upon a rape conviction. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594 (1977).
The Court invalidated such mandatory schemes in Roberts v. Louisiana and Woodson v. North
Carolina. 1d.; see Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (invalidating death penalty
statute that imposed mandatory death sentence upon finding of guilt); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (invalidating death penalty schemes that imposed manda-
tory death sentences without allowingjudge or jury any discretion). When Louisiana and North
Carolina revised their schemes to comply with Woodson, neither state included rape among its
capital offenses. Coker, 433 U.S. at 594.
119. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594 (1977) (finding that only Georgia imposed
death penalty for rape of adult woman).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 595.
122. See infra notes 149-64 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of Coker by
Supreme Court of Florida and Supreme Court of Mississippi).
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Because Georgia was the only state in the country to allow the death
penalty for the rape of an adult woman, the Supreme Court found that legisla-
tive attitude regarding the death penalty for rape "obviously weighs very
heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for
raping an adult woman."'" This conclusion did not end the Supreme Court's
inquiry, however. The Court reviewed jury sentences in Georgia in cases
prosecuted under the law at issue in Coker.24 According to submissions
presented to the Court, the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed sixty-three rape
convictions between 1973 and the time of the Coker decision."2s Of these
sixty-three convictions, only six defendants received the death penalty for
their crimes.126 The Court recognized that the sparing imposition of the death
penalty could simply reflectjuries' reservation of the death penalty for partic-
ularly heinous rapes. 7 However, the Court took notice of the fact that nine
out of every ten juries that had the opportunity to impose the death penalty on
convicted rapists failed to do so.' These numbers convinced the Court that
jury attitudes, like the legislative attitudes the Court had previously addressed,
indicated strong societal disapproval of the death penalty for rape. 29
Next, the Supreme Court cited other more serious crimes for which the
death penalty was not available in Georgia."' For example, a defendant con-
victed of a deliberate killing did not receive the death penalty absent proof of
aggravating circumstances."' Thus, a strange anomaly could occur whereby
Georgia might punish a murderer less severely for ending another's life than
it punishes the rapist who allows the victim to live.' The Supreme Court
123. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596. The Court noted that under Trop, it may also consider
international opinions regarding a particular punishment. Id. at 596 n.10. Because only 3 out
of 60 surveyed major nations in the world authorized the death penalty for rape, this further
weighed against Georgia's statute. Id. (citing DEP'T OF ECONOMIc AND SOCIAL AFFArRS,
UNrED NATIONS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 86 (1968)).
124. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 596-97 (discussing sentencing attitudes ofjuries). Butcf State
v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630,650 (Utah 1997) (finding that imposition of death penalty for prisoner
who committed aggravated assault was excessive and in violation of Utah Constitution and
Eighth Amendment). The Gardner court noted that such an inquiry into jury behaviors regard-
ing punishments for certain crimes may not be feasible. Id In Gardner, no prosecutor had
sought a capital conviction under the provision of the law at issue prior to petitioner's case. Id
125. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 594, 596 (1977).
126. Id.
127. See id. at 597 (acknowledging that low number of death sentences could result from
reluctance ofjuries to impose death penalty except in extreme cases).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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could not accept this notion and used it as a further indicator that Georgia's
death penalty for cases of rape was disproportionately excessive in view of the
crime."'
The Court openly acknowledged rape as a horrible and violent crime,
stating that "short of homicide, it is the ultimate violation of self."' 34 Rape
involves physical and psychological harm to the victim and causes societal
harm by undermining a community's sense of security and well-being.3 5 The
Court further noted that rape is "without doubt deserving of serious punish-
ment, but in terms of moral depravity and injury to the public, it does not
compare with murder."'36 Coker recognized a fundamental difference in the
murderer's victim, for whom life is over, and the rapist's victim, who would
certainly be greatly damaged but "normally not beyond repair."'37
Coker was a plurality decision, with Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and
Stevens joining in Justice White's plurality opinion.138 Justices Marshall and
Brennan concurred in the result, reiterating their position that the death
penalty itself is a cruel and unusual punishment.' Justice Powell, concurring
in the judgment, disagreed with the plurality's broad assertion of the death
penalty's excessiveness for all cases of rape.14 1 Instead, Justice Powell felt
that the Eighth Amendment may not foreclose the imposition of the death
penalty in the case of a particularly brutal and savage rape.'4 ' Justice Powell
believed it unnecessary to make the majority's sweeping assertion that the
death penalty is always a disproportionate punishment for the crime ofrape.
4 2
Justice Powell wanted the Court to wait until a particularly savage rape
resulted in a death sentence before adjudicating the matter entirely. 3 Such
patience would give the Court the time to evaluate whether the objective
indicators of society's "evolving standards of decency" called for the death
penalty in extremely brutal cases of rape.' 4
133. See id. (finding it difficult to accept notion that "rapist, with or without aggravating
circumstances, should be punished more heavily than the deliberate killer").
134. Id. at 597.
135. See id. (acknowledging damage to victim and to society from rape).
136. Id. at 598.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 584.
139. Id. at 600-01.
140. See id. at 601 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that death penalty may prove appropri-
ate punishment in brutal cases of rape).
141. Id. at 603'(Powell, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 601 (Powell, J., concurring).
143. See id. (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that proper facts could show that society does
sanction death penalty for outrageous cases of rape).
144. Id. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring).
1354
LOUISIANA 'S DEATH PENALTY FOR CHILD RAPE
Chief Justice Burger wrote the Coker dissent, which Justice Rehnquist
joined. 45 The dissent sharply disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that
the death penalty is excessive in cases of rape.146 The dissent found the
decision to be unnecessarily broad, foreclosing the death penalty even for
repeated rapists who pose a constant danger to society.'47 The Chief Justice
believed that the decision to protect society from the danger posed by such a
repeated sexual offender was predominantly legislative and that the majority
decision seriously impinged Georgia's legislative judgment.4 '
B. Florida's Reaction to Coker v. Georgia
When Coker came before the Court, two states, Mississippi and Florida,
provided for the death penalty in cases of the aggravated rape of a child.'49
Bufordv. State' provided the Florida Supreme Court its first opportunity to
examine its child rape statute in light of Coker.' Buford involved, among
other things, a challenge to a Florida law imposing capital punishment in cases
involving the sexual battery of a child." 2 The Florida court noted that Coker
involved the rape of an adult woman, leaving unsettled the issue of whether
the death penalty for the rape of a child is a disproportionate punishment.'
145. Id. at 604-22 (Burger, C.L, dissenting).
146. See id. at 605 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (finding that Court's decision prevents Georgia
from imposing most effective form of punishment in case of habitual offender).
147. Id. at 610 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
148. Id. (Burger, C.L, dissenting).
149. Id at 595.
150. 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981).
151. See Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943, 950-51 (Fla. 1981) (finding Coker applicable to
case imposing death penalty for child rapist). In Buford, the Supreme Court of Florida decided
whether the death penalty constituted an excessive punishment for the crime of child rape. Id.
at 950. The defendant in Buford appealed convictions of rape and murder, for each of which
he was sentenced to death. Id at 944. In his appeal, petitioner attacked the constitutionality
of imposing a death sentence for the crime of sexual battery upon a child. Id. at 950. The
Florida Supreme Court first addressed the Coker opinion by acknowledging that the opinion
itself did not decide the issue of whether the death penalty is grossly disproportionate for the
rape of a child. Id. However, the court then looked to the rationale of the Coker decision,
specifically quoting sections in which the United States Supreme Court distinguished rape from
murder and placed great emphasis on the fact that a rapist, if no more than that, does not take
human life. Id. at 951. The Florida Supreme Court thus concluded that "[t]he reasoning of the
justices in Coker v. Georgia compels [the court] to hold that a sentence of death is grossly
disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of sexual assault and is therefore
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment." Id.
152. See FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(2) (1977) (defining sexual battery of child under 12 by
legal adult as capital felony).
153. Buford, 403 So. 2d at 950.
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Despite the difference in the victims' ages in Coker and Buford, the Florida
Supreme Court applied the Coker rationale to the issue of capital punishment
for child rape.'54 The court found that Coker's result hinged on the finding
that rape, unaccompanied by any other circumstances, does not involve the
taking of another human life.'55 The Florida Supreme Court cited language
in Coker seemingly foreclosing the possibility of a death sentence, "unique in
its severity and irrevocability," for any rapist who does not take a human
life. "' Applying Coker, the court invalidated Florida's capital child rape
statute, finding the death penalty "grossly disproportionate and excessive
punishment for the crime of sexual assault."'57
C. Mississippi's Reaction to Coker v. Georgia
Like Florida, in 1977 Mississippi also punished the rape of a child under
the age of twelve with the death penalty. 5 Immediately following Coker, the
Mississippi Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of its child rape law
in Upshaw v. State.'59 The defendant in Upshaw received the death penalty
as a result of his conviction for the rape of his young niece. 6  Upshaw
154. Id. at 950-51.
155. Id. at 951 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598-99 (1977)).
156. Id. (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 598).
157. Id.
158. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65(1) (Supp. 1974) (imposing death penalty on legal
adults convicted of rape of child under 12 years old).
159. See Upshaw v. State, 350 So. 2d 1358, 1360 (Miss. 1977) (finding that Mississippi's
capital child rape statute did not impose disproportionate punishment in light of crime). In
Upshaw, the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether imposing the death
penalty on child rapists constituted excessive punishment. Id. The defendant in Upshaw
appealed his conviction and death sentence for the rape of his young niece. Id. The defendant
premised his argument on the basis that the imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Id.
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court heard arguments on the case prior to Coker, the court
deferred consideration until the United States Supreme Court decided Coker. Id. After Coker,
the Mississippi court requested additional briefs on the applicability of Coker to the Upshaw
case. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court decided that Coker only applied to the rape of an
adult woman. Id. The court focused on the fact that the Coker opinion carefully refiained from
deciding the issue of capital punishment in relation to the crime of child rape and that the
opinion specifically stated that the case involved the rape of an adult woman at least seven times.
Id. The court then premised its holding on its view of the United States Supreme Court's
position relating to the Eighth Amendment as a barrier to the imposition of the death penalty for
minor crimes. Id. The court then concluded that the rape of a child was not a minor crime, and
absent a constitutional infirmity, the court should defer to the legislature'sjudgment in defining
crime and punishment. Id. at 1361. Thus, the court found the statute constitutional. Id.
160. Id. at 1359.
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reached the Mississippi Supreme Court prior to Coker; however, the court
postponed its decision on the constitutionality of the death penalty for child
rape pending Coker's outcome.' The court found that Coker's numerous
references to an "adult woman" made Coker inapplicable to cases of child
rape. 62 Thus, the court distinguished Coker because, according to the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court, Coker "took great pains to limit its decision to the
applicability of the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman."'63 Because,
in the Upshaw court's view, the rape of a child involved a much more serious
offense than the rape of an adult, the Mississippi state legislature remained
free to determine that the death penalty was proper for the rape of a child.'
Many post-Coker cases interpreting the breadth of Coker's holding
suggest that the Mississippi Supreme Court's narrow reading of Coker in
Upshaw is a minority position. 65 In fact, the Mississippi Supreme Court
conformed to the majority understanding of Coker's reasoning in 1989, when
the court found that life imprisonment was the maximum penalty for the rape
of a child under Mississippi law.'66 Most courts and commentators believe
that Coker stands for the proposition that the death penalty is an inappropriate
and excessive penalty for crimes not involving the taking of human life.167




165. See United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439, 1457 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (Alarcon, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (acknowledging that Supreme Court espoused principle in Coker
that death penalty may not apply absent homicide); State v. Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000, 1017
(Mont. 1979) (finding Coker relevant to all crimes for which death penalty is imposed that did
not result in loss of life).
166. See Leatherwood v. State, 548 So. 2d 389, 402-03 (Miss. 1989) (finding that life
imprisonment was maximum punishment for rape of child under Mississippi law). At the time
of Leatherwood, in order to impose the death penalty, Mississippi law required a finding that
the defendant actually killed, attempted to kill, intended that a killing take place, or contem-
plated lethal force be employed. Id. Because none of these factors exist in the case of rape, the
death penalty cannot be imposed on a rapist. Id.
167. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1457 (Alarcon, J., concurring and dissenting) (finding Coker
to proscribe use of death penalty for defendant who does not take human life); Leigh Dingerson,
Reclaiming the Gavel: Making Sense Out of the Death Penalty Debate in State Legislatures,
18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 873, 878 (1991) (arguing that Coker finds that the imposi-
tion of death penalty for crimes from which no death occurs is unconstitutional and that no
subsequent Supreme Court decision has challenged this precedent); Stephen P. Garvey, "As the
Gentle Rain From Heaven ": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1009 n.74
(1996) (stating that courts generally understand Coker to prohibit death sentences for crimes
other than murder); Ved P. Nanda, Recent Developments in the United States and Internation-
ally Regarding Capital Punishment -An Appraisal, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 523, 532 (1993)
(finding that Coker stands for proposition that death sentence is excessive when victim is not
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Recently, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court reached the same conclusion
as Upshaw regarding Coker's applicability to statutes imposing the death
penalty for crimes other than the rape of an adult woman. 6 '
V Louisiana's Capital Child Rape Statute
A. The Statute's First Challenge
In 1995, the legislature of Louisiana revised the state's aggravated rape
statute to provide the death penalty as punishment for those convicted of
raping a child under twelve years of age." 9 In so doing, Louisiana became the
first state to enact a statute imposing the death penalty on child rapists since
the Supreme Court's decision in Coker 170 Furthermore, Louisiana is currently
killed); Van W Ellis, Note, Guilty but Mentally 11l and the Death Penalty. Punishment Full
of Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing, 43 DUKE L.J. 87, 94 (1993) (referencing Coker to
require capital offenses to be defined by unjustified human death). However, there are numer-
ous state and federal statutes that impose the death penalty for nonhomicide offenses that are
beyond the scope of this note. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)(1) (1994) (imposing death penalty for
possession of specified quantity of drugs while part of continuing criminal enterprise); 720 ILL.
COMP STAT. ANN. 5/30-1 (West 1997) (imposing death penalty for crime of treason against
state); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-25-55 (1997) (imposing death penalty for aircraft piracy within
state airspace).
168. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1070 (La. 1996) (concluding that Coker does
not proscribe death penalty in cases of child rape), cert. denied sub nom. Bethley v. Louisiana,
117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
169. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 1996) (imposing death as punishment for
child rape). The relevant text of this section provides:
A. Aggravated rape is a rape committed upon a person sixty-five years of age or
older or where the anal or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful
consent of the victim because it is committed under any one or more of the follow-
ing circumstances:
(4) When the victim is under the age of twelve years. Lack of knowledge of the
victim's age shall not be a defense.
(C) Whoever commits the crime of aggravated rape shall be punished by life
imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence. However, ifthe victim was under the age of twelve years, as provided by
Paragraph A(4) of this Section, the offender shall be punished by death or life
imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence, in accordance with the determination of the jury.
Id. (emphasis added).
170. But cf Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595 (1977) (noting that Florida and Missis-
sippi permitted death penalty in cases of child rape at time of Coker decision). While Coker
acknowledged the existence of the Florida and Mississippi laws, the Court reserved judgment
on these laws because Coker specifically dealt with capital punishment for adultrape. Id. at 592.
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the only state in the union to provide the death penalty in cases of child
rape. 7' Such obvious departure from the national consensus eventually
required the Louisiana Supreme Court to decide the constitutionality of
imposing the death penalty on child rapists.
Shortly after the Louisiana legislature revised the aggravated rape statute,
the district attorney in New Orleans charged Anthony Wilson with the aggra-
vated rape of a five-year-old girl and began prosecution under the newly
enacted death penalty provision of the aggravated rape statute. Wilson
moved to quash the indictment, arguing that the death penalty was dispropor-
tionate to the crime of rape, and the trial court granted the motion.74 In a
separate case, the district attorney in Monroe charged Patrick Dewayne
Bethleywith the aggravated rape of three girls underthe same aggravated rape
statute and sought the death penalty. 7 ' Bethley also moved to quash the
indictment on the grounds that the death penalty was unconstitutionally
disproportionate to the crime of rape. 76 The court granted the motion; how-
ever, the court found the proportionality argument unpersuasive and instead
dismissed the case because the statute failed to sufficiently limit the class of
defendants eligible for the death penalty. '77 The state appealed both decisions,
and the Louisiana Supreme Court consolidated the cases and issues upon
accepting the appeal. 7 ' Thus, the case of State v. Wilson'79 afforded Louisi-
ana's highest court the opportunity to determine the constitutionality of one
171. See Leatherwood, 548 So. 2d at402-03 (finding that life imprisonmentwas maximum
punishment for rape of child under Mississippi law); see also Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943,
951 (Fla. 1981) (holding that Florida's capital child rape statute was unconstitutional under
Eighth Amendment in light ofSupreme Court's reasoning in Coker). But cf S. 258, 144th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1997) (proposing amendmentto Georgia's rape statute to include death penalty
when victim is under 12 years old). The proposed bill failed to pass. Id.
172. See Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1064 (reviewing constitutionality of Louisiana legislature's
decision to include death penalty as punishment for child rape).
173. Id. at 1064-65.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1065. Bethley's case was particularly heinous because he knew he was HIV
positive at the time of the rapes, and one of the rape victims was Bethley's own daughter. Id.
One commentator has advocated the death penalty in cases of rape involving an HIV positive
rapist. See Stefanie S. Wepner, The Death Penalty: A Solution to the Problem of Intentional
AIDS Transmission Through Rape, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 941,965 (1993) (advocating capital
punishment in cases of rape by HIV positive assailants because prison will not be adequate
punishment to deter potential rapists or vindicate rights of victims).
176. State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1065 (La. 1996), cert. deniedsub nom. Bethley v.
Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
177. Id.
178. Id at 1063.
179. 685 So. 2d. 1063 (La. 1996).
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of the state's most controversial laws. i30
B. State v. Wilson
After a brief discussion of the history of the Eighth Amendment, the
Wilson court concluded that the Eighth Amendment proscribed punishments
which (a) made no measurable contribution toward acceptable goals of pun-
ishment and thus imposed needless pain and suffering or (b) were grossly out
of proportion to the severity of the crime."' The Louisiana court then ad-
dressed the applicability of Coker to the case before it. The court acknowl-
edged that Coker forbade the imposition of the death penalty in the case of the
rape of an adult woman.' However, despite language in Coker seemingly
foreclosing the use of the death penalty regardless of the type or brutality of
the rape, the Wilson court found Coker applicable only if the rape involved an
adult woman. 3'
180. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1073 (La. 1996) (finding that death penalty is
not excessive punishment for child rape), cert. denied sub nom. Bethley v. Louisiana, 117 S.
Ct. 2425 (1997). The Louisiana Supreme Court directly addressed whether the death penalty
for child rapists who did not kill violated the Eighth Amendment in light of Coker. Id. at 1064.
The case was a facial challenge to LouisianaRevised Statute § 14:42, which allowed imposition
of the death penalty for the rape of a child under 12. Id. The court chose to interpret Coker in
a very narrow fashion, focusing on the "great pains" that the Coker plurality took to refer only
to the rape of an adult woman in its opinion. Id. at 1066. This narrow reading afforded the
Louisiana court the opportunity to distinguish Coker because the issue in Wilson was the rape
of a child, a crime the Wilson court found even more heinous than the rape of an adult. Id. The
court then analyzed the statute using the "evolving standards of decency" test that the Supreme
Court employed in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), and endorsed in many subsequent cases,
including Coker. Id. at 1067-69. The court concluded that it should afford great deference to
the legislature's decisions when the court attempts to ascertain the proper standards of society.
Id. at 1067. While acknowledging that Louisiana was the only state to impose such harsh
punishment for this crime, the court determined that the uncertainty of state legislatures in the
post-Furman era regarding what crimes are sufficient to invoke the death penalty may explain
this apparent opposition. Id. at 1068-69. Thus, simply because a state is presently in the
minority does not make its judgment less worthy of deference. Id. at 1069. Given all of these
considerations, the court concluded that "[w]hile the Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty
for minor crimes..., the crime of rape when the victim is under the age of twelve is certainly
not a minor crime." Id. at 1070. Thus, the court upheld the statute. Id. at 1073. The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari because the case had not proceeded to a conviction. See
Bethley v. Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425, 2425-26 (1997) (statement of Justice Stevens) (noting
jurisdictional bar to Court's review).
181. Wilson, 685 So. 2d.at 1065 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,173(1976)). This
is also the test that the Supreme Court utilized in Coker. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977).
182. Wilson, 685 So. 2d. at 1066.
183. Id.
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The Wilson court based its narrow interpretation of Coker on the fact that
the plurality in Coker took "great pains" to refer only to the rape of an adult
woman in its opinion."8 4 In support of this contention, the court noted four-
teen occasions in either the plurality opinion, concurring opinion, or dissent-
ing opinion where the phrase "adult woman" appears.' Thus, the Louisiana
Supreme Court quickly found Coker inapplicable to the question of imposing
the death penalty on child rapists.'86 The next Part of the Note questions such
a conclusion.
After distinguishing Coker, the court next conducted its own proportion-
ality analysis of the constitutionality of the death penalty for child rapists.8 7
The court first observed that children are a "particularly vulnerable" segment
of society in need of the state's special protection.' In the court's opinion,
the duly elected legislature had set the standards of a "maturing society" by
recognizing the devastation involved in child rape and the subsequent harm
resulting to the child and the community."8 9 In the court's opinion, the Louisi-
ana legislature addressed this harm by amending the state's aggravated rape
statute to permit the death penalty in cases of aggravated rape when the victim
is under twelve years of age.' Presumably, the Louisiana legislature felt that
imposing the death penalty for child rapists would help the state fulfill its
responsibility to protect its children."'
184. Id. Interestingly, this is the same language that the Mississippi Supreme Court used
in Upshaw v. State. However, the Wilson opinion never cites Upshaw. See Upshaw v. State,
350 So. 2d 1358, 1360 (Miss. 1977) (upholding state's capital child rape law despite Coker
decision).
185. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1066.
186. See id. (finding rape of child more detestable than rape of adult woman).
187. See id. at 1067-73 (addressing issues of proportionality).
188. L at 1067. The court stated that children are neither mature enough to, nor capable
of, defending themselves. Id. It is thus the state's responsibility to protect them. Id.
189. Id. "Maturing society" refers to the test that the Supreme Court adopted for Eighth
Amendment challenges in Trop v. Dulles. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (stating
"evolving standards" test for first time). The Court found that the Amendment must draw its
meaning from "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Id. The Court accepted the "evolving standards" test in many subsequent cases involving capital
proportionality review. See Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119, 1120 (1994) (accepting that
Eighth Amendment's proportionality guarantee "draw[s] its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at
101)); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (applying "evolving standards" testto Eighth
Amendment challenge).
190. State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (La. 1996), cert. deniedsub nom. Bethley v.
Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
191. But see John Q. Barrett, Death for ChildRapists May Not Save Children, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 18,1997, at 51 (questioning effectiveness of imposing death penalty to deter child rapists).
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The Wilson court elected to give great deference to the decisions of its
legislature, particularly because it acted in near unanimity on this issue.
192
The court cited Supreme Court authority indicating that the legislature need
not select the least severe penalty for the crime as long as the penalty com-
ports with the Eighth Amendment. 93 Also, the court presumed that legislative
enactments are constitutional under both the federal and Louisiana constitu-
tions. 194 The court completed its analysis of the propriety of the legislation
with the statement, "courts must exercise caution in asserting their views over
those of the people as announced through their elected representatives."195
The Wilson court next compared the Louisiana punishment for child rape
with the punishments allowed other states.' 96 The court recognized Louisiana
as the only state in the country to allow the death penalty for the rape of a
child under the age of twelve.'97 The court did not find this fact determina-
tive, however, and noted that at the time of Coker, three states provided for
the death penalty in cases of child rape.' The court viewed these statutes, all
enacted prior to Coker, as suggesting a trend in public opinion favoring the
death penalty for the heinous crime of child rape.' 99 The court further sug-
The author questions whether allowing the death penalty for child rape cases will actually
protect the children. Id. The enormity of death penalty litigation is an ordeal that could
traumatize child victims. Id. Further, the author argues that perpetrators who are friends or
relatives of the victim may use the possibility of death to dissuade the children from reporting
sexual abuse. Id. The author advocates a careful consideration of all of these issues before state
legislatures rush to protect children with less than effective measures. Id.
192. See Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1067 (discussing popularity of death penalty for child
rapists in Louisiana's legislature). The court noted that the Louisiana House of Representatives
passed the amendment with a vote of 79 to 22. Id. at 1067 n.5. The measure then went to the
Senate where it passed by the even greater margin of 34 to 1. Id. Subsequently, the governor
signed the amendment into law. Id.
193. Id. at 1067 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976)).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 1067-69 (surveying other states' punishments for child rape).
197. Id. at 1068.
198. Id. Those states were Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee. Id. The Supreme Court
invalidated the Tennessee statute in Woodson v. North Carolina because the statute mandated
the death penalty upon conviction. Id.; see generally Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976) (invalidating mandatory death penalties). The Florida Supreme Court found the Coker
analysis controlling in its invalidation of Florida's statute in State v. Buford See supra notes
150-57 (discussing Buford). The court makes no mention of the Mississippi Supreme Court's
decision in Upshaw v. State. See supra notes 158-64 (discussing Upshaw). The Wilson court's
failure to cite Upshaw is certainly perplexing because Upshaw's holding is similar to Wilson,
especially in regards to its narrow reading of Coker as applicable only in cases of rape involving
adult women.
199. See Statev. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1068 (La. 1996), cert. deniedsub nom. Bethley
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gested that other states may want to adopt similar statutes, but refuse to do so
because of the uncertainty created by the Supreme Court's holdings in this
area.2" ° The court ended its jurisdictional survey, concluding that a constitu-
tional infirmity does not exist in a statute simply because a state chose to be
the first to enact it.
20
Next, the Wilson court addressed the propriety of imposing the death
penalty when no death occurs as a result of the object crime.2 2 The Louisiana
Supreme Court centered its discussion of this proposition on the United States
Supreme Court's analysis in Enmund v. Florida.2 3 Although Enmund invali-
dated the death sentence involved in that case, the Wilson court relied instead
on the language in Enmundthat used the defendant's conduct as a standard to
determine excessiveness. 2°4 The Louisiana court determined that the death
sentence was not excessive punishment for child rape because the deplorable
nature of the rapist's conduct makes the death penalty appropriate.2 5 The
court further noted that the Supreme Court has recently allowed the death
penalty for a felony-murder defendant who did not actually kill the victim but
only acted with reckless indifference to human life.20 6 The Wilson court used
these examples to conclude that the Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty
only for "minor" crimes and that child rape is certainly not a "minor" crime.
20
7
v. Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997) (pointing to this trend as possibly marking "an evolution
of a standard"). The "evolution of a standard" refers to the test for proportionality announced
in Trop. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (stating that Eighth Amendment must
"draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society).
200. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1069. The Wilson court quoted Chief Justice Burger's dissent
in Coker as support for this reasoning. Id Chief Justice Burger suggested that it is difficult to
judge proportionality by looking solely at what legislatures had refrained from doing because
the Court's inconsistent holdings in the area might stifle state action. See Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584,614 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (describing Court's holdings on Eighth Amend-
ment as "less than lucid"). The Wilson opinion actually credited Justice Powell, rather than
Chief Justice Burger, with this point. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1068-69.
201. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1069. The court noted the possibility that other states are
awaiting the outcome of the challenges to the Louisiana statute before enacting their own,
similar statutes. Id.
202. Id. at 1069-70.
203. See id. (discussing Enmund v. Florida).
204. Id. at 1069.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 1070 (referring to Tison v. Arizona); see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 158 (1987) (affirming death sentence when defendants exhibited "reckless indifference"
to human life).
207. State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1070 (La. 1996), cert. deniedsub nom. Bethley v.
Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
1363
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1335 (1998)
Thus, the Louisiana court ended its proportionality review of the state's
capital child rape statute, finding that the death penalty for child rapists was
not excessive punishment."8
VI. Analysis of State v. Wilson
An analysis of Wilson should begin with a reiteration of the requirements
of proportionality review mandated by Coker and other Supreme Court
decisions. Coker requires a reviewing court to use the following three objec-
tive factors to guide its decision: legislative attitudes,jury attitudes, and other
crimes and their respective punishments within thejurisdiction in question.209
In addition to these objective factors, Coker further found the Constitution to
require a court to apply its own judgment to the question of the acceptability
of the death penalty for a type of crime.2"0 Given these requirements, the
analysis of the correctness of Wilson necessitates three separate inquiries.
First, did Wilson correctly interpret Coker as inapplicable to the constitution-
ality of the death penalty in cases of child rape? Second, did the Wilson court
ignore required elements of proportionality review that might have led the
court to a different conclusion? Finally, did Wilson reach the correct conclu-
sions based on the factors used by the Louisiana Supreme Court in its propor-
tionality review?
A. Wilson's Approach to the Applicability ofCoker
The Wilson court mistakenly emphasized the use of the phrase "adult
woman" in Coker and, thus, wrongly found Coker inapplicable to the facts of
Wilson. As stated in Part IV, most courts and scholars have not placed such
a restrictive inference on Coker's language.21 The Supreme Court used the
phrase "adult woman" in Coker because the facts in Coker presented only the
rape of an adult woman. The proper function of appellate courts is not to
determine facts and circumstances, but to establish rules of law based on the
facts and circumstances presented.2"2 Thus, appellate courts, including the
208. Id. at 1073. The court also addressed the issue of whether the statute allowed for
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. See id. at 1070-73 (finding that statute survives
challenge of arbitrary application).
209. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (listing these objective factors as
crucial to Eighth Amendment judgments).
210. See id. at 597-98 (concluding that Court had its own "abiding conviction" that death
penalty was excessive for rape).
211. See supra note 165 (providing examples of broader interpretations of Coker).
212. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1179-80 (1989) (highlighting Justice Scalia's beliefthat appellate courts should pronounce rules
to govern subsequent similar cases instead of deciding cases based on subjective tests such as
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Supreme Court, generally refrain from issuing advisory opinions on issues that
are not before the Court. This doctrine, often called judicial restraint,2" 3 can
easily explain the Supreme Court's care in Coker to limit its ruling to the facts
immediately before the Court. However, the rationale and rules of law set
forth in the analysis leading to the specific holding should apply with equal
force to facts and circumstances that are extremely similar to those in Coker,
such as the facts of Wilson.
The analysis used by the Supreme Court in Coker indicates that Coker's
holding applies to all rapes, regardless of the brutality involved.2" 4 The
Louisiana Supreme Court briefly quoted some of this language from Coker
but decided that because the United States Supreme Court's analysis referred
to the rape of an adult woman, it was inapplicable in the case of the rape of a
child."' Such a sweeping dismissal of the motivation behind the Supreme
Court's decision to declare rape an improper crime upon which to impose a
death sentence is misplaced. By focusing only on the phrase "adult woman"
in Coker, the Louisiana court never addressed what appears to be the central
motivation of the Coker decision: the absence of death in the crime.21 6
The Louisiana court quoted the statement in Coker that "in terms of
moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, [rape] does
not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human
life .... The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not."2 7 The
Wilson court further quoted Coker's contention that the death penalty "is an
excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life."2 8
facts or circumstances). Justice Scalia states that his opinions attempt to set forth a rule of law
rather than resting on facts and circumstances because such a practice constrains lower courts
as well as the Supreme Court and Justice Scalia himself. Id. at 1179. Such constraint is neces-
sary to ensure predictability of precedent, which increases the law's power and stability. Id.
213. See id. (referring to practice of limiting holdings to immediate facts as "the course of
judicial restraint").
214. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 601 (Powell, J., dissenting) (dissenting to majority's assertion
that death penalty is excessive punishment in all cases of rape). In fact, Justice Powell believed
that the Coker opinion went too far by holding that capital punishment is always a dispropor-
tionate penalty for the crime of rape, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the rape. Id.
(Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell agreed that the death penalty was ordinarily a dispro-
portionate penalty for the common rape. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). He disagreed, however,
with what he saw as the Court's complete ban on capital punishment for rape even in particu-
larly vile and heinous cases. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
215. Statev. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (La. 1996), cert. deniedsub nom. Bethley v.
Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
216. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (finding absence of victim's death
strongly persuasive evidence that death penalty was disproportionate to crime of rape).
217. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1066 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 598).
218. Id. (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 598).
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Despite acknowledging the reasoning in Coker, which appears to find the
death penalty excessive punishment for crimes in which no death results, the
Louisiana Supreme Court failed to reconcile Coker's holding with its decision
that child rape is deserving of the death penalty. Instead, the Wilson court
wrongly decided that the analysis of Coker could not apply, despite the
obvious similarity of the facts, because the victims' ages differed. 2 9 Because
Coker should apply to the Louisiana child rape statute, the statute's death
penalty provision is unconstitutional based on the Coker precedent.
B. Wilson s Failure to Address Required Factors of
Proportionality Review
Even if Coker is inapplicable to the facts in Wilson, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court failed to conduct a proper proportionality review. The court
addressed only one of the three required objective factors in its review of
Louisiana's capital child rape statute.22 Thus, the court failed to compare
other crimes and their respective punishments within Louisiana to the crime
and punishment at issue in Wilson.22'
The Wilson court, in failing to compare other death eligible crimes in
Louisiana with child rape, ignored one of the concerns expressed in the Coker
opinion. Had the Wilson court compared other death eligible crimes in
Louisiana to child rape, the court should have reached the same result as the
Supreme Court in Coker.2" Louisiana's current capital sentencing regime is
similar to the capital structure in Georgia at the time of Coker.' The Louisi-
ana Code of Criminal Procedure requires a jury finding of at least one statu-
tory aggravating circumstance before the imposition of any death sentence. 4
For example, today in Louisiana, a deliberate killer can only receive the death
219. See id. (finding Coker inapplicable when victim is under age of 12).
220. See id. at 1067-69 (looking only to attitudes of other legislatures while ignoring jury
attitudes and comparisons of other crimes and punishments in Louisiana).
221. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 600 (addressing other, more serious, crimes in Georgia for
which defendants do not receive death penalty).
222. See id. (comparing other crimes and punishments in Georgia to death sentence for
rape). The Coker Court found that certain deliberate killings in Georgia were not punishable
by death absent certain aggravating circumstances. Id. The Court could not accept the notion
that society could punish a rapist more severely than a deliberate killer. Id.
223. Compare LA. CODECRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 905.3 (West 1997) (requiringjury finding
of one statutory aggravating circumstance before state imposes death sentence even in cases of
deliberate, first-degree homicide) with GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102 (Supp. 1976) (allowing
imposition of death penalty only afterjury finding of statutory aggravating circumstance).
224. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (imposing death penalty only after specific
jury finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance).
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penalty upon a jury finding of certain aggravating circumstances.2" This
requirement of ajury finding of aggravating circumstances before the imposi-
tion of the death penalty also existed in Georgia at the time of Coker.26
Consequently, Louisiana could punish a child rapist whose rape exhibits one
of the statutory aggravating circumstances more severely than it could punish
a deliberate killer whose crime lacks one of the aggravating circumstances.
This is exactly the anomaly the Supreme Court refused to accept in Coker.27
However, although such an anomaly in the law of Georgia was a factor
prompting the Coker Court to overturn Georgia's capital rape statute, the
Wilson court never made a similar inquiry.
The Wilson opinion also omitted any reference to another factor consid-
ered in Coker's proportionality review: jury attitudes. 28 Cokerfoundthatnine
out often juries that were given the opportunity to utilize the death penalty in
cases of the rape of an adult declined to do so. 9 The Supreme Court viewed
this as another factor indicating a general unwillingness by society to impose
the death penalty in cases ofrape. 0 The Wilson court could not complete such
an inquiry, however, because it did not have any reliable figures regarding
juries' attitudes towards imposing a death sentence on child rapists, or any
rapist, due mostly to the Supreme Court's decision in Coker. In fact, no
executions have occurred for a nonhomicide crime in the United States since
1975, and no judge or jury has imposed the death penalty on a defendant in a
nonhomicide case since 1977." These facts should have provided a glaring
example to the Wilson court that society's evolving standards do not include
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes not resulting in death.' 2
225. See id. (requiring statutory aggravating circumstances before imposition of death
sentence).
226. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (concluding that such disparity in
sentencing between killers and rapists is unacceptable); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102
(allowing imposition of death penalty only after jury finding of statutory aggravating circum-
stance).
227. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 600 (finding possibility of deliberate killer receiving lighter
punishment than rapist unacceptable).
228. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1067 n.6 (La. 1996) (addressing Court's use
ofjury attitudes in Coker opinion), cert. deniedsub nom. Bethley v. Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425
(1997). Although the court recognized the importance that the United States Supreme Court
placed on jury attitudes in Coker, the Louisiana Supreme Court never addressed jury attitudes
regarding the death penalty for child rape.
229. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
230. Id.
231. See State v. Garner, 947 P.2d 630, 650 (Utah 1997) (commenting on lack of death
sentences for nonhomicide crimes in United States in past 20 years).
232. See id. (finding lack of death sentences for crimes not resulting in death "noteworthy"
in evaluation of contemporary standards of decency).
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C. Analysis of Wilson's Use of Factors Addressed by the Court
Although the failure of Wilson to address two of the three factors used by
the Supreme Court in proportionality analysis already renders the opinion
suspect, those infirmities are not the only flaws in the opinion. Wilson's
complete deference to legislative judgment without testing the legislative
decision against proper constitutional standards creates a further problem
within the opinion." Although the court acknowledged that legislative
punishments must not be disproportionate to the offense,"4 the court never
engaged in an independent inquiry into whether the statute in question is
disproportionate. Despite Louisiana being the only state to impose the death
penalty in cases of child rape, the court upheld the statute by giving "great
deference to [the] legislature's determination of the appropriateness of the
penalty."' "s Without a proper, independent judicial proportionality analysis,
such legislative deference appears to suggest that the legislature may provide
any punishment not unconstitutionally excessive, and a punishment is not
excessive if the legislature provides for it. Such circular logic completely
abandons the spirit behind meaningful proportionality review guaranteed by
the Eighth Amendment.
Another flaw in the Wilson court's analysis relates to its conclusion based
on the survey of punishments imposed for child rape in other jurisdictions.us
The court correctly concluded that Louisiana is the only state in the nation to
impose the death penalty for child rape. 7 In Coker, the Supreme Court found
that evidence of only one jurisdiction allowing for the death penalty in cases
of rape weighed heavily against the death penalty for the rape of an adult
woman.s However, instead of following the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Coker, the Louisiana Supreme Court asserted that a state being the only one
to provide for the death penalty for a class of criminals does not make that
decision constitutionally infirm. 9 Such an assertion seems to directly contra-
233. See Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1067 (affording Louisiana legislature nearly complete
control over crime and punishment).
234. See id. (giving legislature great control over selection of punishments as long as
penalties are not disproportionate to crimes).
235. Id. at 1073.
236. See id. at 1067-69 (comparing other states' punishments for child rape to Louisi-
ana's).
237. Id. at 1068.
238. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,596 (1977) (finding that capital punishment was
unsuitable for rape of adult woman).
239. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1069 (La. 1996) (stating that minority status
of state's view does not make its judgment less worthy of deference), cert. denied sub nom.
Bethley v. Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
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dict the primary reasoning of Coker, as well as other Supreme Court cases
addressing this aspect of proportionality review.24 For example, Coker places
great emphasis on the fact that prior to Furman, sixteen states allowed for the
death penalty for the crime of rape.241 Furman prompted all states authorizing
the death penalty to redraft their death penalty legislation to comply. with
Furman's requirements. In so doing, only three of the sixteen states previ-
ously imposing the death penalty for rape chose to continue this practice.242
Furthermore, two of those three had their capital sentencing structure invali-
dated because they required the mandatory imposition of the death penalty.243
In their redrafted statutes, each of those states omitted rape from its revised
list of capital crimes.244
Thus, at the time of Coker, Georgia was the only jurisdiction in the
nation allowing its juries to impose a death sentence in cases of rape involving
a female, adult victim.245 As stated, the fact that a defendant could die for the
commission of rape in Georgia, yet nowhere else in the United States, factored
heavily into the decision that capital punishment was an excessive penalty for
rape. 6 Thus, it is apparent that the Supreme Court not only required an
inquiry into the punishments imposed on similar crimes in otherjurisdictions,
but the Court found this analysis exceedingly helpful and important. The
Wilson court, however, ignored this Supreme Court precedent.247 Instead of
240. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 793 (1982) (finding that because only eight
states allow for death penalty in felony-murder cases with no finding of actual intent to kill,
death penalty is disproportionate punishment when defendant lacks intent to kill); Coker, 433
U.S. at 596 (stating that current attitudes with respect to death penalty for rape is not wholly
unanimous among all states, but weighs heavily toward rejecting such punishment); cf State v.
Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 650 (Utah 1997) (holding that Utah's statute imposing death penalty
for prisoner convicted ofaggravated assault was unconstitutional because only twojurisdictions
in United States allow such punishment).
241. Coker, 433 U.S. at 594.
242. See id. (analyzing various state punishments for rape). The three states were Georgia,
Louisiana, and North Carolina. Id.
243. Id. Louisiana and North Carolina were the two states that had to revise their capital
punishment statutes. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 595-96.
246. See id. at 596 (finding sentencing discrepancy unacceptable).
247. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1982) (finding that only eight juris-
dictions allow death penalty solely based on participation in felony-murder). The Enmund
Court found this relatively small number ofjurisdictions informative in its decision that society
had rejected capital punishment based solely on participation in a felony murder. Id.; Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (finding that only one jurisdiction imposed death penalty
for rape of adult woman). The Court considered this low number evidence that society had
rejected capital punishment as a "suitable penalty for raping an adult woman." Id.
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finding a lack of broad support for a particular punishment important, the
Wilson court virtually ignored the import of Louisiana's status as the lone
state in the country to impose the death penalty for child rape.248
The final and most glaring deficiency in Wilson occurs during the court's
discussion of the propriety of imposing the death penalty when no death
resulted from the crime.249 This discussion is undoubtedly an attempt by the
court to undertake the requirement of Coker for a court to apply its own
judgment to questions regarding the appropriateness of the death penalty."
Wilson used two Supreme Court cases to support its conclusion that the death
penalty is an appropriate punishment for child rape, even when no death
results, because of the appalling nature of the crime." In the two Supreme
Court cases cited in Wilson, the defendants received death sentences for their
participation in felony murders and appealed their convictions under the
Eighth Amendment. 2 The two cases, when taken together, suggested to the
Louisiana Supreme Court that the death penalty is permissible in situations
when the defendant has neither actually killed nor intended to kill, but simply
acted with reckless indifference to human life.23
Although this fact lends support to the Wilson conclusion, the Supreme
Court precedents upon which the Wilson court based this conclusion are
simply inapplicable to the facts of the case. The court relied on the two
felony-murder cases for the proposition that the death penalty is appropriate
when no death results from the crime. 4 However, those two cases arose from
two felony-murders, necessarily requiring that the cases involved crimes in
248. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063,1069 (1996) (finding no constitutional infirmity
in statute "simply because [Louisiana] chose to be first"), cert. denied sub nom. Bethley v.
Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
249. See id. at 1069-70 (discussing death penalty option when no death occurs from object
crime).
250. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (finding that Constitution contemplates that Court's "own
judgment will be brought to bear" on acceptability of death penalty under Eighth Amendment).
251. See Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1070 (concluding that appalling nature of crime, severity
of harm to victim, and harm imposed on community suggest that death penalty is not excessive
for crime of child rape). The two cases upon which the court relied were Enmund v. Florida
and Tison v. Arizona. Id.; see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (finding death
penalty acceptable for defendant who plays major role in felony-murder and acts with "reckless
indifference to human life"); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796 (finding death penalty excessive for
defendant only tangentially involved in felony-murder who neither killed nor possessed intent
to kill).
252. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 146-58 (determining propriety of death sentence of defendants
convicted of felony-murder); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788-801 (reviewing death sentence for
defendant involved in felony-murder).
253. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1070.
254. Id. at 1069 (discussing Enmundand Tison under heading of"Crime Without Death").
1370
LOUISIANA 'S DEATH PENALTY FOR CHILD RAPE
which the victims' death did occur." In both cases, the Supreme Court's
inquiry only revolved around whether the respective defendants sufficiently
participated in the felonies that led to the victims' deaths. 6 The Supreme
Court did not discuss the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty when
no death resulted from the crime in either case because the victims actually
died in both cases. Thus, the Wilson court erroneously based its conclusion
that the death penalty is appropriate punishment for crimes in which the
victim is not killed on two Supreme Court cases in which the victims were, in
fact, killed.
VI. Conclusion
As the foregoing analysis indicates, the Wilson court incorrectly failed
to apply the Supreme Court's holding in Coker to a fact pattern identical in
every way except for the age of the victim. 7 Further, the court failed to
address two of the three factors that the Supreme Court has found necessary
to review the proportionality of a punishment in relation to its crime. 8 Also,
the analysis employed by the Louisiana Supreme Court is seriously flawed in
many respects. 9 All of these facts lead to the conclusion that Wilson is a
poorly reasoned decision and that its conclusion is incorrect in light of Coker.
Therefore, when the Supreme Court inevitably decides the issue,26 Louisi-
ana's capital child rape statute should not survive scrutiny under Coker's
reasoning. The Court should find that the statute allowing the death penalty
255. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 140-41 (noting that defendants shot and killed four victims
after defendants stole victims' car); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 784 (1982) (stating that
defendants shot and killed victims during armed robbery).
256. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 156 (determining defendant's individualized culpability to
determine propriety of death penalty); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 (focusing on defendant's
culpability in underlying crime to determine propriety of death penalty).
257. See supra notes 211-19 and accompanying text (discussing Wilson's failure to apply
Coker's holding to child rape).
258. See supra notes 220-32 and accompanying text (discussing Wilson's failure to apply
two key factors of proper proportionality review).
259. See supra notes 233-56 and accompanying text (discussing flaws in Wilson's anal-
ysis).
260. See Bethley v. Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425, 2425-26 (1997) (denying certiorari to
defendants involved in Wilson decision). Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Breyer, attached a statement to the denial of certiorari indicating that the denial did not,
in any sense, constitute a ruling on the merits of the case. Id. at 2425. The Justices noted that
a jurisdictional bar arguably exists to the Court's review of the issues in Wilson until the
Louisiana state court reaches a final judgment. Id. at 2425-26. In criminal cases, the imposition
of the sentence defines finality. Id. at 2426. This statement indicates a strong likelihood that
at least these three Justices would agree to review the Wilson decision if and when a defendant
is sentenced to die under the Louisiana statute.
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for the rape of a child under twelve years old is an unconstitutionally exces-
sive punishment in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of
the Eighth Amendment.
Although most courts and commentators have interpreted Coker to
preclude the death penalty in nonhomicide crimes,26 the Louisiana Supreme
Court's failure to recognize such a preclusion indicates that the United States
Supreme Court needs to further clarify the impetus behind Coker. When the
Court has provided greater constitutional protections in capital cases than non-
capital cases, it has explained the need for these heightened protections by
stating that "death is different.""2 2 The Court has generally used this phrase
to describe the unique difference between death as a form ofpunishment and
all other punishments imposed by the law.26 However, the Court could easily
use this same benchmark when it evaluates the types of crimes for which the
death penalty is an appropriate punishment. Thus, a state should only impose
the death penalty as punishment for crimes resulting in death.2' Such a clear
and definitive standard would provide the judiciary with a clear rule of law
that affords the objectivity the Supreme Court requires in proportionality
review."' Therefore, the Court should explicitly adopt a standard for capital
proportionality review that implicitly runs throughout Coker: without death
in the crime, there will be no death in the punishment.
261. See supra note 167 (listing courts and scholars concluding that Coker prohibits death
penalty for nonhomicide crimes).
262. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (acknowledging need for
heightened constitutional protections when possibility of capital punishment exists).
263. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980) (finding that death is different
because Court can draw "bright line" between death sentence and all other forms of punish-
ment).
264. But cf supra note 167 (listing statutes that impose death penalty for crimes that do
not inherently involve loss of life). A standard that restricts the death penalty to only those
crimes from which a death resulted would not preclude death sentences under many of these
statutes, such as the "drug kingpin" statute. It would simply require proof that the so-called
"kingpin's" continuing criminal activities resulted in a death before the death penalty becomes
a permissible penal option.
265. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing Court's desire for objective
factors to guide proportionality analysis); see also supra note 212 (stating Justice Scalia's belief
that appellate courts' adoption of definitive rules of law provides guidance and constraint for
judiciary).
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